What exactly transforms in the thinking of a manager when they shift from a strategy of defense to proactively shaping the context in which their organization operates?

This transformation relates not only to business processes but also to the overall logic of our existence. An analogy with medicine is relevant here: preventive actions are always more effective than crisis management. Monitoring the context and understanding trends allow one to be prepared for changes before they become irreversible. If a manager ignores the external environment, any legislative change or new tax regulation becomes a catastrophe rather than a manageable condition of the game.
We do not evaluate changes as "positive" or "negative." We speak about subjective readiness to be a participant in the dialogue. If a business takes a passive position, it automatically becomes an object of others' decisions. The statistics on the longevity of small and medium-sized businesses, especially in Ukraine, are a consequence of such a "survival strategy." A lack of resources for long-term planning creates a cycle: the company lives day by day, unaware of being part of a larger ecosystem.
This is a matter of changing paradigms. For a long time, we existed in a culture of mutual alienation, where business was perceived as evil, and the state as a hostile environment toward it. However, the modern complexity of the world requires a different approach: business must recognize its belonging to the overall system, and the state sector must change its managerial culture. That is why transformation must occur in parallel: through the development of strategic thinking in business and through architectural solutions in state management.

The path to realizing that one must work with the state is very diverse. For now, most do not even think about it. But in practice, we see two types of managers: those who already understand this, and those who do not. What needs to happen within a business for it to feel that the time has come? At what moment should interaction with the state transform from an "optional" into a fully-fledged function?

The adoption of lobbying legislation has become a significant challenge. In fact, now any communication with a government manager—whether a meeting or participation in a conference—requires declaration. Business found itself facing a choice: to register independently, hire specialists, or create separate structures. This forced companies to address the question: "Why do we need this, and how do we use this toolkit?"

In our program, we explore these opportunities not as a formal requirement, but as a means of developing the business environment. Usually, when asked about the main problem, both people and businesses point to corruption. But the real challenge for business is the absence of transparent and, most importantly, predictable rules. Transparent rules can change weekly, and it is impossible to operate under such conditions.

Predictability arises only when you become a part of the decision-making process. We need to show businesses the model of transitioning from a passive "recipient" of regulatory norms to a proactive stance. And this is not about lobbying personal interests, but about influencing decisions for the benefit of the economy as a whole. The logic is simple: if business works, the economy works. And a strong economy can provide for the army, education, and healthcare. This is a unified system, and we strive for businesses to realize their subjectivity within it.

There are industries where the GR function is traditional and understood: energy, pharmaceuticals, and large business in general. These are sectors with a high level of regulation, where interaction with the state has been built over decades. However, are there less obvious areas or businesses today for which subjectivity in relationships with the state is becoming a new necessity? Where else, apart from the usual industries, is there a growing need for professional interaction with the governmental context?

The most obvious example today is Defense. Before the full-scale invasion, this sector primarily existed in the format of technology transfer and export of individual solutions. However, during the war in Ukraine, a new, modern defense industry has been built virtually from scratch. This is a space of immense innovation and investment, which brings along logistics, energy, and high technology.

This is a sector that is inherently integrated with the state much more than any other. Here, business stands at a crossroads. On one hand—unique experience that no other country in the world has, and of which we can be proud. On the other—lack of obvious solutions regarding transparency and pricing. At the beginning of the war, we saw a paradox: businesses involved in defense were essentially being discouraged from making profits. But without profit, a business ceases to be a business and loses its capacity for development. This is a challenge that requires not just ad hoc solutions, but a systematic dialogue with the state

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The next sector is medicine. The level of Ukrainian expertise in surgery and rehabilitation today is unprecedented. We see a paradox: people who have gone abroad are coming back to Ukraine for quality medical services. However, the state still tends to produce solutions predominantly focused on the public sector. Private medicine—which bears a huge share of the burden (including treating military personnel)—often remains "invisible" as a full-fledged player in shaping policies.

A similar situation exists in education, particularly informal education. The market creates products that are often of higher quality than state offerings. But since these institutions do not have separate licenses, it is difficult to "count" them and see them as one large community. When everyone is on their own, businesses struggle to unite and approach the state together, saying, "We are a large market, we need to be taken into account."

We see emerging markets that are already operating and have significant potential. However, as long as they are not identified as a single community, they remain invisible to the state. Our task is to help such businesses come out of the shadows and begin impacting the rules by which they live.

You note that GR is not PR. In Ukraine, this is a widespread mistake where the functions are mixed. Can you elaborate on this difference?

At the core of GR is always trust. Any decisions are made by people, not anonymous institutions, so trust is a strategic asset here: it is hard to capitalize on but incredibly easy to destroy with one ill-considered step.

I have seen cases where during a meeting in an office, there was an honest and constructive conversation: the parties jointly sought solutions and defined the limits of the possible. However, once a participant left and wrote an emotional post in the style of "everything is lost," the space for further dialogue disappeared. This is the main conflict between the logic of GR and the logic of PR.

GR is a transparent but often non-public job. Publicity happens as a final stage. You can argue repeatedly behind closed doors, present arguments, even disagree, but ultimately find a common solution that benefits both the state and the business. Only then is it appropriate to engage PR tools to scale this success.
The difference in expected outcomes makes this gap obvious. In PR, coverage of the audience is key. In GR, coverage does not matter—convincing a specific decision-maker is what matters.

Moreover, in such sectors as Defense, excessive publicity is a direct threat. We remember cases at the beginning of the war when after the visits of officials to production facilities, there were enemy attacks there. This is the cost of misunderstanding where communication ends and where security and systemic work begin.

Are there situations where publicity becomes a necessary step before beginning a systemic dialogue with the state? That is, when a business needs to first change societal attitudes towards a particular problem to prepare the ground for future regulatory decisions. In what cases is working with audience awareness the foundation for changing the rules of the game?

We often see only the tip of the iceberg, but all the systemic work that preceded the result remains unseen. Who is interested in knowing about exhausting meetings of working groups or sharp discussions where the parties long could not reach an agreement? Publicity in such processes can only harm. One can try to gain quick coverage through conflict, but it won't bring you closer to the goal.

This embodies the fundamental difference: PR focuses on disseminating information and forming a certain perception, while GR aims for a specific managerial decision.
PR merely sheds light on the context in a positive or negative light; it is a supportive tool. However, it cannot guarantee a decision since it is made not by the mass audience but by a specific individual. If you fail to build a constructive dialogue with this person, no media support will help. Moreover, if you resort to public pressure before attempting to negotiate, it can create serious barriers for further work.

Returning to the basics, what exactly constitutes the GR complex if we break down this function into its components? We have already established that lobbying is just a part of this process; what other elements shape a holistic system of interaction with the state?

Despite all the technologies and tools, at the center of GR is always the human being. Decisions are not made by ministries, but by specific people or teams within them. And everything in this system hinges on the quality of human interaction.

Often, colleagues dream of a career in GR but possess low emotional intelligence. This is almost a death sentence for the profession. You may hold a high position in an international corporation, but if you kick the door open, the system will reject you.

For me, GR is the capital of relationships and the ability to build genuine human connections where trust exceeds protocol. I often give a real-life example: having a hundred people you can call at midnight—this is not about the number of contacts but about the depth of those connections. In GR, you overlay a managerial decision on this foundation of trust. And even if your question is too complex, a person who trusts you will not just say "no" but will suggest the right route or explain the limitations. When there is trust, instead of a brick wall, you receive navigation.

Is GR a component of business value, and how exactly does this impact the capitalization of a company? How does the ability to interact with the state context convert into real assets and the resilience of an organization in the market?

This manifests in costs. There is a false perception that GR consists solely of costs: for large teams, agencies, or unclear contributions. In reality, one must count differently: how much do you lose when you do not protect your interests?

The real cost of GR is measured by losses from untimely or poorly thought-out regulatory decisions. For example, an increase in rent payments, changes in transportation tariffs, or new tax norms can cost businesses tens of millions of dollars a year. If you think that GR is "expensive," you forget that one balanced decision can cover these costs for the next ten years. This is straightforward math in the business model.

We see this in complex cases like the situation with military payments or the introduction of the carbon tax (CBAM). When a business fails to unite its efforts and build a common position with the state in a timely manner, the final bill turns out to be astronomical. Passivity today leads to direct financial losses tomorrow.

In the context of Ukraine's future accession to the EU: what regulatory risks are hidden in this process for Ukrainian businesses, and how can GR help companies adapt to new European rules?

European integration is not just about new rules but also about how to use them. We often ignore a key norm of many EU directives—economic feasibility. In Europe, they understand that one cannot implement new environmental standards overnight if it destroys an entire industry.

A striking example: a Ukrainian manufacturer is trying to upgrade equipment to meet our "European" regulations, only to find that such technologies do not physically exist or cost billions. Meanwhile, in Germany or Italy, similar plants operate on old capacities. Why? Because there, the principle operates: if an investment has not yet paid off, the state does not force the owner to throw the equipment in the trash. They are given time—5 or 10 years—to complete the investment cycle and gradually transition to new standards. They are not fined or shut down; they negotiate a transitional period.

In Ukraine, however, we often observe "overfulfilling the plan": our internal requirements become stricter than the original European ones. We ratify international agreements 100%, whereas other countries do so selectively, protecting their own market.

Unfortunately, our culture of public administration still lacks the concept of economic feasibility. Officials often do not want or know how to calculate how their decisions will impact the viability of businesses. This creates a vast field of work for GR: businesses must teach the government to consider not just "points of directives" but also the real economic consequences for the country. We should not merely copy European law but implement it in a way that keeps Ukrainian businesses competitive.

How should Ukrainian businesses strategically prepare for the implementation of European norms in the context of GR to protect their economic viability and avoid becoming victims of "excessive regulation"?

Preparation for a European future is primarily about educational activities. We need to stop fearing interaction and shed outdated stereotypes.
The biggest pain point in our society is the perception of business as "evil." I've seen this firsthand: when young professionals transition from ministries to the private sector, it sometimes takes them two years just to muster the courage to write the word "business" in communications instead of an abstract "organization." They have to undergo an internal transformation to realize that business is not the enemy, but a force that invests real money in the country's development and assists people.
This is a two-way story. On one side are officials who need to see entrepreneurs as partners. On the other side are businessmen who must learn to respect the state apparatus and recognize the value of cooperation. Someone has to take the first step toward this rapprochement.
Our task in the program is to be those who initiate this dialogue. We work on ensuring that businesses have the capability not just to "solve issues" but to take responsibility for the collective space. Only through respect, emotional intelligence, and understanding the value of each player can we build a modern system of relationships where business and state work towards a unified result.

What is the outcome of the training program? What does it provide?

In the program, we primarily work with participants on how to systematically analyze the environment in which a business operates. The first task of a top manager is to understand how the state apparatus functions. If you do not realize how this system works, you will not be able to build effective interaction with it.
There is a dangerous illusion that GR is merely an opportunity to voice a position at a meeting or send an official letter. In reality, it is a complex task of building trust with an environment that defaults to perceiving business as an additional regulatory burden.

Professional maturity in GR begins with the realization that you must become an intellectual partner to the state. Your proposal must not only be beneficial for the business but also valuable to your counterpart—as a way to address governmental or societal challenges. I often say: leave your ambitions at the door. If achieving a result requires giving credit for a successful reform to an official—do it. Your true goal is to have a decision made that protects the interests of the company, not public recognition.
The cost of lacking a professional GR function for large businesses is measured in millions of dollars. In sectors such as metallurgy or energy, this is a matter of the physical survival of enterprises. For instance, strategic decisions regarding the scrap metal market for companies like "Interpipe" are literally questions of whether the plant will operate tomorrow. When raw material security and energy consumption are at stake, you cannot rely on situational agreements. You need a strategy.
GR in our program is about transitioning from a lottery and situational responses to systematic management of regulatory risks. It is about how to make the voice of business a significant argument in the state agenda.